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 1 
µ$XWLVP¶RUµ$XWLVP6SHFWUXP'LVRUGHU¶'RHVHLWKHUUHSUHVHQWD1DWXUDO.LQG
of Psychological Disorder? 
Abstract 
In DSM-³DXWLVPVSHFWUXPGLVRUGHU´$6'LVDQHZGLDJQRVWLFFDWHJRU\
HIIHFWLYHO\UHSODFLQJWKHSUHYLRXVFDWHJRU\RI³DXWLVP´,QWKLVSDSHU I question 
whether either effectively represents a psychological natural kind with significant 
scientific and explanatory value. 
'HVSLWHWKHQHZFDWHJRULVDWLRQ³$6'´DQG³DXWLVP´DUHHIIHFWLYHO\
synonymous, and current understandings of ASD are based largely on previous 
research focussed specifically on autism. However, there has been no stable 
consensus over the past 40 years about what autism actually is. No biological 
explanation has been discovered, and no single psychological theory can account for 
the heterogeneity of autistic symptoms. A recent large-scale population-based study 
failed to identify a unifying cognitive account of the variety of symptoms of autism. 
In the philosophy of science literature, there are widely accepted accounts of 
natural kinds which emphasise their role in scientific explanations and induction. 
These claim that natural kinds can typically be identified by clusters of properties 
which are held together by causal processes and which reflect the causal structure of 
the world in terms of their explanatory and predictive value. However, the concept of 
ASD fails to indicate any causal explanation and has very limited discriminant and 
predictive validity. Consequently ASD, as a diagnosis, cannot plausibly be seen as a 
psychological natural kind, since it does not appear to function as a powerful 
explanatory concept in science. Psychologists involved in autism diagnostic services 
should try to explain more clearly what it is that they believe they are diagnosing. 
 
 
The concept of autism has been with us since Leo Kanner first identified and named it 
in the 1940s. However, its defining characteristics have altered dramatically since 
then, and particularly so from the 1980s onwards. The assumption that it represents a 
distinct kind of diagnosable disorder with significant scientific and explanatory value 
has persisted throughout this period. In particular, this view now underpins the 
thinking of clinical and educational psychologists who actively participate in autism 
diagnosis teams, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that such an assumption has 
remained largely unexamined. However, the view of autism as a predominantly 
scientific category has been challenged by, among others, the philosopher Ian 
Hacking (2015) who has argued that our current conception of autism has been 
shaped substantially more by advocacy and activism than by science. 
In this paper, I examine the question of whether autism can constitute a natural 
kind with explanatory significance in science. I address this question with particular 
reference to whether the various symptoms of autism can be explained by any 
unifying psychological deficiency which might constitute a psychological natural 
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kind. I start by noting the various changes in its conception introduced in DSM-5 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Next I consider the main theories about 
hypothesised psychological deficits presumed to underlie autistic symptomatology. I 
discuss one recent and particularly authoritative study of a large number of young 
people with an autism diagnosis which demonstrates very strongly that no single 
cognitive deficit can account for the symptoms leading to the diagnosis. This, along 
with previous research, casts doubt on the idea that autism can be regarded as a 
psychological natural kind definable by a single psychological feature. 
I then discuss the function of natural kinds as explanatory concepts in science, 
with reference to two closely related theories of natural kinds proposed by the 
philosophers, Richard Boyd and Muhammad Ali Khalidi. I describe the key features 
of these theories, in particular the requirement that natural kinds should in some way 
reflect the causal structure of the world such that they can ground reliable 
explanations and inductions. I explain that these accounts have general applicability 
across all the sciences and that natural kinds in science have explanatory and 
inductive significance. I then argue that the category of autism has little scientific 
value in this sense and I conclude that, on current evidence, autism does not represent 
a psychological natural kind. 
 
Changes in diagnostic criteria 
In DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), autism was identified with the 
³WULDGRILPSDLUPHQWV´ZKLFKZHUHLPSDLUPHQWVin social interaction, (2) 
impairments in language and communication, and (3) restricted or repetitive 
behaviours and interests (RRBIs). In DSM-5 this has now been superseded by a new 
FDWHJRU\RI³DXWLVPVSHFWUXPGLVRUGHU´ (ASD). To meet the criteria for a diagnosis 
the individual concerned needs to display two types of impairment: (1) persistent 
deficits in social communication and interaction, and (2) RRBIs (as in DSM-IV). This 
in effect amounts to the current definition of ASD, albeit in brief form. Some 
V\PSWRPVQHHGWREHSUHVHQWEXWQRWQHFHVVDULO\HYLGHQWGXULQJWKHFKLOG¶VHDUO\
development and the symptoms must cause clinically significant impairment in the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VIXQFWLRQLQJ7KHQHZFDWHJRU\RIDXWLVPVSHFWUXPGLVRUGHUFRQWUDVWVZLWK
the previous categorisation in DSM-IV, which listed five sub-categories in what was 
WKHQWHUPHG³3HUYDVLYH'HYHORSPHQWDO'LVRUGHUV´3''± these were: autism, 
Asperger syndrome, Rett syndrome, childhood disintegrative disorder (CDD), and 
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pervasive developmental disorder (not otherwise specified) (PDD-NOS). Whilst 
³DXWLVP´KDVQRZEHHQRPLWWHGDVDIRUPDOFDWHJRU\LWQHYHUWKHOHVVUHPDLQVLQ
regular use as short-hand for the new category of ASD, with which it appears virtually 
synonymous. There were various reasons for excluding the other sub-categories from 
DSM-5, some of which can be briefly summarised here. Rett syndrome is a rare 
genetic disorder predominantly affecting girls and is in effect a distinct medical 
disorder. CDD is also a very rare condition, and there is significant uncertainty as to 
whether it actually constitutes a distinct disorder. PDD-NOS refers to cases where the 
individual displays some autistic traits which are typically mild and do not amount to 
an unambiguous diagnosis of autism. Some of these would now be covered by the 
VHSDUDWHFDWHJRU\RI³VRFLDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQGLVRUGHU´LQ'60-5.  
However, the most notable exclusion from DSM-5 is Asperger syndrome. The 
criteria in DSM-IV failed to distinguish it clearly from autistic disorder, and 
particularly from high-functioning autism, and there has been wide variation in how it 
has been applied in practice (Happé , 2011). What has persisted however is the 
FRQFHSWRIDQ³DXWLVPVSHFWUXP´, such that this FRQFHSWUDWKHUWKDQ³DXWLVP´
simpliciter, now constitutes the named disorder in DSM-5. Typically however, the 
two terms are used interchangeably, as I shall do here. 
In addition, DSM-KDVLQWURGXFHGDQHZFDWHJRU\RI³VRFLDO-communication 
GLVRUGHU´7KHFULWHULRQIRUWKLVLVHVVHQWLDOO\WKHVDPHas the first criterion for ASD, 
namely a persistent deficit in social cognition and interaction skills. Someone who 
displays such a deficit without any restricted or repetitive behaviours and interests 
(the second criterion for an ASD diagnosis) cannot be diagnosed with ASD. The only 
available diagnosis for such individuals is social-communication disorder. 
Due to lack of space, I cannot review all the various changes that have occurred 
WRWKHGLDJQRVWLFFULWHULDIRUDXWLVPVLQFH.DQQHU¶VWLPHEXWVHH9HUKoeff, 2013, for a 
detailed account of how these changes reflect some fundamental shifts in the 
conceptualisation of autism). Nevertheless, the quite major changes from DSM-IV to 
DSM-5 would suggest that autism is not a condition that has yet achieved much 
stability in its conceptualisation. 
 
Psychological theories of autism 
A number of theories have been proposed about an underlying psychological deficit 
which can account for the presenting symptoms of the condition. Such a unifying 
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deficit, if found, might be associated with some kind of neurological abnormality 
which would explain the nature of the disorder. However, no theory so far advanced 
has been able to do this and several autism researchers are now asking whether any 
such explanation is even possible (e.g. Happé, Ronald & Plomin, 2006). Typically, 
the psychological theories put forward have tended to focus on hypothesised cognitive 
deficiencies in people with an autism diagnosis. These include D³WKHRU\RIPLQG´
deficit (an impaired ability to understand the mental states of others), weak central 
coherence (difficulty in integrating detailed information into larger meaningful 
wholes), and executive function deficit (an inability to plan and co-ordinate actions to 
achieve intended goals). Although other psychological deficits have also been 
hypothesised, these three have generated the most interest for researchers. However, 
the large number of research studies which have investigated the association between 
these cognitive features and children with an autism diagnosis have failed to produce 
any consistent and replicable findings which might explain all the symptoms of 
autism (Brunsdon & Happé, 2014). 
This is clearly demonstrated by a recent population-based study which is one of 
the largest of its kind (Brunsdon et al., 2015). Recruiting adolescents with an ASD 
diagnosis from the UK Twins Early Development Study, the researchers, based at the 
Institute of Psychiatry in London, studied 181 young people with ASD, 73 non-ASD 
co-twins and 160 normally developing controls. All of the ASD group were diagnosed 
XVLQJ³JROG-VWDQGDUG´LQVWUXPHQWVVSHFLILFDOO\WKH$XWLVP'LDJQRVWLF,QYHQWRU\-
Revised and the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule. All participants were 
assessed on a range of tests designed to test for a theory of mind deficit (ToM), weak 
central coherence (CC), and executive function deficit (EF). All the tests used were 
taken from previous studies in which the test procedures had been established. The 
results of this study failed to demonstrate a clear and consistent pattern of cognitive 
deficits in the ASD sample. Only a small number demonstrated deficits in a single 
area (5% in ToM; 8% in CC; and 6% in EF). Others had deficits covering at least two 
areas, and the largest group (32%) had deficits in all three areas. The authors argue 
that this therefore represents a characteristic pattern in ASD adolescents. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that more than two thirds of the sample did not show this 
pattern. Moreover, it seems from the reported percentages showing the various 
cognitive deficits that 9% of the ASD sample failed to demonstrate any deficit in any 
of the areas examined, but this apparent result is not discussed by the authors. It was 
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also noted that corresponding cognitive deficits occurred in the non-ASD co-twins 
and in the controls, though in smaller numbers. The combination of all three deficits 
(ToM + CC + EF) was found in 11% of the non-ASD co-twins and in 6% of the 
controls, despite their lacking a diagnosis. Thus, when tested using operationalized 
measures of the three hypothesised cognitive deficits in one of the largest high-quality 
empirical studies yet conducted on this subject, no consistent and unifying account of 
the psychological underpinning of ASD symptoms emerged. 
The results of this study offer further evidence for what is now termed the 
³KHWHURJHQHLW\´RIDXWLVP RUWKH³IUDFWLRQDEOHDXWLVPWULDG´+DSpé & Ronald, 2008). 
In their paper, Happé and Ronald summarise evidence that the three domains of 
autism (as defined in DSM-IV) appear to have independent causes at the genetic, 
neural and cognitive levels ± ZKDWWKH\GHVFULEHDV³IUDFWLRQDEOH´FDXVHV7KH\JRRQ
to say: 
³7KHsuggestion that the different aspects of the ASD triad have fractionable 
FDXVHV«LVVRPHWLPHVWDNHQDVDQDWWDFNRQWKHYDOLGLW\RIWKHGLDJQRVLVRI
DXWLVP«+RZHYHULWLVTXLWHFRPSDWLEOHWRDVVHUW«WKDWWKHUHVXOWLQJPL[KDVD
special quality, distinct prognosis and response to intervention, and is therefore 
ZRUWK\RIDGLVWLQFWGLDJQRVWLFODEHO´S 
'HVSLWHWKLVWKH\GRQRWVD\DQ\WKLQJPRUHDERXWZKDWWKLV³VSHFLDOTXDOLW\´DFWXDOO\
is, and in view of the substantial changes in the defining characteristics of autism over 
many years this is clearly very difficult to do. There is also a question of whether 
autism does actually have a distinct prognosis in the sense of distinguishing it from 
other conditions (I return to this question below). Consequently, the heterogeneity of 
autism, coupled with the lack of any consistent and replicated evidence for a unifying 
FRJQLWLYHDFFRXQWRIWKHV\PSWRPVRIWKHFRQGLWLRQRUH[SOLFDWLRQRILWV³VSHFLDO
TXDOLW\´UDLVHVLJQLILFDQWGRXEWVDERXWZKHWKHUautism or ASD can represent a 
natural kind in psychology. I therefore now examine this issue in the context of 
natural kinds in science. 
 
Is autism a natural kind? 
Before discussing autism here, it is first necessary to say a little about natural kinds in 
science. Progress in science typically depends upon the identification of kinds of 
things that are presumed to exist in nature. The successful identification of such kinds 
enables the relevant phenomena to be organised into meaningful schemes of 
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classification. Natural kinds can provide the basis for explanations of salient 
phenomena and support reliable inductions and predictions about future phenomena 
in which the kinds may feature. These kinds are classes of objects, individuals or 
entities which share some set of causally linked properties which can account for their 
explanatory power. The paradigmatic examples of natural kinds are the chemical 
elements, such as sodium and chlorine. Many of the chemical properties of the 
individual elements are explicable in terms of their atomic number and structure. 
Biological species are also frequently cited as examples of natural kinds. 
There are various accounts of natural kinds in the philosophy of science 
literature. Those that are applicable to biology, medical science, and other special 
sciences (including psychology) involve the notion of a clustering of relevant 
properties which together define the kind, without it being necessary for all such 
properties being present in every instance of the kind. A particularly influential 
account is given by Richard Boyd (1991, 1999) who emphasises that natural kinds 
must accommodate to the causal structure of the world and that the cluster of 
properties in the kind are held together by sets of ³KRPHRVWDWLFcausal mechanisms´. 
A similar, but more general, account of natural kinds as property clusters in causal 
networks is provided by Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2013) in which the defining 
properties of the kind are linked by causal processes in some manner. What these 
accounts have in common is their emphasis on causal processes as integral to the 
identification of natural kinds. As such, they provide an account of kinds which is 
applicable across all the sciences and which reflects the central epistemic endeavour 
in science generally ± i.e. to uncover the explanatory causal processes for salient 
phenomena. This contrasts with rather weaker accounts of natural kinds (e.g. 
Chakravartty, 2007; Dupré, 1993) which accept clusters of properties as defining the 
kind without the additional criterion of causal linkages amongst these properties. 
However, we normally expect natural kinds to have significant explanatory value in 
science and to reflect the causal processes underpinning their explanatory function. 
Many physical diseases can be regarded as natural kinds in virtue of their 
explanatory and predictive functions (e.g. Dragulinescu, 2010; Williams, 2011). This 
applies to infectious diseases as well as more complex diseases caused by, for 
example, autoimmune disorders and genetic abnormalities. In such cases, the disease 
kinds can be understood as clusters of characteristic signs and symptoms linked by 
complex causal chains, consistent with the accounts given by Boyd and Khalidi. 
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Specifically, the identification of a diagnosable disease is important for understanding 
WKHFDXVDOSURFHVVHVXQGHUO\LQJWKHSDWLHQW¶VV\PStoms and for grounding predictions 
about the likely prognosis. Another way of putting this is to say that medical scientists 
generally expect disease categories to have good discriminant and predictive validity. 
How do these considerations relate to autism? As currently understood, autism 
looks like a term that covers a range of psychological features and as such it could be 
seen as a property cluster kind. However, if it is to constitute a natural kind on either 
%R\G¶VRU.KDOLGL¶VDFFRXQWthe properties (symptoms) by which it is defined must 
be shown to be causally linked in some way and it must also be able to ground 
inductions and predictions about its consequences (e.g. about effective treatments, if 
any, and prognosis). In all these respects, autism fails as a diagnostic category with 
explanatory value. 
First, a diagnosis of autism conveys no information about the aetiology of the 
condition in the particular individual receiving the diagnosis. More generally, there is 
no known causal association amongst the range of symptoms, the conjunction of 
which are said to constitute autism. 
Second, the diagnosis carries no implications for specific interventions, except 
where dedicated services for people with an autism diagnosis (e.g. in schools or the 
community) have been made available following decisions by service commissioners. 
In such cases, the implications for intervention arise because of stipulative local 
policies, rather than from research studies demonstrating effective and empirically 
validated treatments with that particular group. In the case of people with autism and 
intellectual disabilities, there are no appropriate and effective interventions which are 
not equally effective for other people with intellectual disabilities (Bromley et al., 
2012; Collins, 2016). In such cases, the choice of intervention should be based on a 
GHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VVSHFLILFDELOLWLHVDQGQHHGVUDWKHUWKDQRQDn 
apparently irrelevant diagnosis. 
Third, the prognostic implications of an autism diagnosis are rather unclear, 
with highly variable outcomes in adulthood for those diagnosed in childhood (Helt et 
al., 2008; Levy & Perry, 2011; Magiati et al., 2014). Whilst those children receiving 
the diagnosis can be expected to have difficulties with social skills and independent 
functioning in adult life, it is not clear how much these result from autism per se 
rather than from intellectual disability. Of course, many people with an autism 
diagnosis do not have an intellectual disability, but in these cases the adult outcomes 
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appear to be rather more variable, with some individuals able to live independent and 
productive lives and form intimate relationships. Reviews of research in this area tend 
to agree that early childhood IQ and language level are important predictors of 
outcome in higher functioning individuals (Helt et al., 2008; Levy & Perry, 2011; 
Magiati et al., 2014). Generally studies of long term outcome depend upon 
retrospective data regarding diagnoses made in childhood and may therefore depend 
upon initial assessments of variable quality. However, a recently published 
prospective study, in which participants were assessed at ages 2, 3, and 19, again 
found that IQ scores in early childhood strongly predict later outcomes for children 
with an ASD diagnosis (Anderson et al., 2014). The authors also report that, by the 
age of 19, 9% of youths no longer had a clinical diagnosis and an additional 28%, 
whilst retaining features of ASD, nevertheless had much improved social and 
cognitive functioning. 
Interpreting the findings from outcome studies, which have very variable 
methodologies and sample sizes, is inevitably difficult and consequently it might be 
argued that a diagnosis of autism does have significant predictive value. However, it 
remains the case that disentangling the predictive validity of an ASD diagnosis from 
that of intellectual disability is very difficult in many cases. Moreover, because the 
FDWHJRU\RI³VRFLDO-FRPPXQLFDWLRQGLVRUGHU´ZDVRQO\LQWURGXFHGLQ'60-5, there 
are no long-term outcome studies comparing the predictive validity of this category 
with ASD, but it is not immediately clear why these should differ in any substantial 
way. 
In summary, autism does not seem to be a concept which strongly reflects the 
causal structure of the world due to its lack of explanatory significance and its very 
limited predictive validity. 
 
Conclusions 
The accounts of natural kinds given by Boyd and Khalidi, which emphasise the role 
of causal processes in identifying kinds in science, are comprehensive accounts 
applicable across all the sciences. In particular, they accord well with many disease 
concepts in medical science, including infectious, autoimmune, and neurological 
diseases amongst others, where we need to know about causal processes. However, on 
current evidence, the concept of ASD does not look like any kind of distinct and 
diagnosable disease and it does not appear to represent a natural kind of psychological 
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disorder. Whilst future research might change this picture, there is currently no known 
genetic or neurological explanation for it, despite huge international research efforts 
over many years, and it has so far proved impossible to describe in any clear terms 
what it is that people with an ASD diagnosis share, other than the diagnosis itself. The 
concept itself does not appear to do any explanatory work and offers little by way of 
clear predictions about the prognosis for those diagnosed beyond what can be 
SUHGLFWHGIURPDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VLQWHOOHFWXDODQGODQJXDJe levels and specific social-
cognitive deficits. 7KLVLVWKHFDVHUHJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHUZHDUHUHIHUULQJWR³DXWLVP´
RU³$6'´ 
Given the heterogeneity of autism and its poor scientific value, it surely falls to 
those psychologists involved in autism diagnostic services to try to make clear what 
exactly they think they are diagnosing. Since any intervention plan for an individual 
with identified social-cognitive impairments needs to be based upon their specific 
profile of strengths and needs, a truly individualised formulation and treatment plan 
could presumably dispense with such an apparently empty diagnosis. 
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